In this article, we show, in the context of partial hedging, that some important relationships about comonotonicity and convex order cannot be translated to countermonotonicity in general because of the possibility of over-hedging. We propose a new notion, called proper hedge, that can effectively avoid over-hedging. Different characterizations of a proper hedge are given, and we show that this notion is useful in translating relationships between comonotonicity and convex order to the case of counter-monotonicity. As an application in the insurance context, we apply our results to identify desirable structural properties of insurance indemnities that make an insurance contract appealing to both the policyholder and the insurer.
Introduction
Consider a portfolio with random value X at the end of a reference period. We define a hedge for this portfolio as an additional asset that can be added to the portfolio to offset the variability of the price of the original portfolio. Hence, adding the hedge reduces the risk, measured in terms of variability, associated with portfolio value at the end of the reference period. To formalize the idea, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 1 A random variable Z is said to be a variance hedge for the random variable X if Var (X + Z) ≤ Var (X).
Moreover, Z is said to be a convex hedge for X if
If, in addition, (X, Z) is counter-monotonic 2 , Z is said to be a counter-monotonic convex hedge for X.
Obviously, a convex hedge is a variance hedge, but not vice versa in general.
In portfolio theory, a hedge usually refers to a self-financing portfolio that replicates some given financial claim at any time point in a given time interval; see, for instance, Björk (2009) . In this paper, the definition of a (variance, convex, or counter-monotonic convex) hedge is less stringent. The requirement of exact replication over a time interval is relaxed to reduction of variability of the pay-off of a given financial claim at a future time point. Therefore, the (variance, convex, and counter-monotonic convex) hedges we define and study in this paper have to be understood as partial hedges in the traditional sense.
Before investigating the notion of counter-monotonic convex hedges, we recall the following well-known properties about comonotonic sums and convex order. For any integrable random variables X, Y , and Z, i.e. with finite expectations,
and
Both (2) and (3) are special cases of a more general result (see Lemma 4 below), which asserts that if X i ≤ cx Y i for i = 1, 2 and if (Y 1 , Y 2 ) is comonotonic, then
Since comonotonicity and counter-monotonicity are two opposite extremal dependence structures, it is natural to wonder whether analogous results of (2) and (3) hold for countermonotonicity. More precisely, one conjectures that
A possible interpretation of statement (4) is that if position X is less risky (variable) than position Y , and asset Z can offset price movements of X, then position X + Z is again less 1 See Section 2 for the definition and properties of the convex order ≤ cx . 2 See Section 2 for the definition blue and properties of comonotonicity and counter-monotonicity. risky (variable) than Y . In particular, according to Definition 1, the implication (4) would mean that any asset that is counter-monotonic with X is a convex hedge of X. For statement (5) , an interpretation would be that the order of riskiness is preserved on the portfolio level when an asset that is counter-monotonic with the less risky sub-portfolio is added to both sub-portfolios.
Unfortunately, neither conjecture (4) nor (5) holds true in general, as demonstrated by the following counter-example.
Example 1 Let W be any standard normal variable, and define
Then X ≤ cx Y , and (X, Z) is counter-monotonic. However, X + Z = 3W/2 ≥ cx −W = Y , which contradicts (4). If we define
The reason why X + Z is even riskier than both Y and Y + Z in the example above is that Z over-hedges X in that adding Z to X not only eliminates the original risk of X but also introduces additional risk. Indeed, we can easily see that the counter-monotonicity of (X, Z) does not necessarily imply that Z is a hedge for X. To this end, we notice that
The counter-monotonicity of (X, Z) only guarantees the positivity of −2Cov (X, Z), but in case Var (Z) is sufficiently large when compared to −2Cov (X, Z), Z will not be a hedge, and thus not a convex hedge for X.
From the above counter-example and discussion, one sees that for a given position X, not every counter-monotonic asset Z is risk-reducing because of the possibility of over-hedging. The objectives of this paper are multifold. In Section 3, we propose a new notion, called proper hedge, which requires a counter-monotonic asset to satisfy an additional condition. Natural interpretations and different characterizations of the additional condition will be given. In Section 4, we prove that a proper hedge will never over-hedge by showing that both conjectures (4) and (5) hold true when Z is a proper hedge of X. In Section 5, we apply the results obtained in Sections 3 and 4 to the study of the marketability of insurance indemnities. We identify desirable properties that an indemnity schedule should possess in order for the insurance contracts to be beneficial to both the policyholder and the insurer. In particular, we show that in order for an insurance indemnity to be mutually beneficial regardless of the risk preference and risk profile of the policyholder, it is necessary and sufficient for the indemnity schedule to be 1-Lipschitz.
Before closing this introduction, we want to emphasize that the concepts and definitions of hedging studied in this paper are purely based on stochastic ordering in which the levels of riskiness of positions are compared by convex order. We do not take into consideration the preference of individual decision makers as well as the (no-arbitrage) market price of a hedge. Indeed, while a convex hedge can reduce the risk of a given position, an expected utility maximizer is not always better off by buying a convex hedge. To see this, assume that his utility function is given by some increasing and concave function u. He will purchase an additional asset Z only if the following inequality is fulfilled:
where π(Z) is the market price of Z. The assumption that Z is a convex hedge for X does not necessarily imply that (6) is fulfilled. Furthermore, it may happen that inequality (6) is fulfilled even if Z is not a convex hedge for X. These possibilities are illustrated by the following example. (6) is violated. By modifying the utility function slightly (considering (1 − ε)u(x) + εũ(x) for some strictly concave utility functionũ and positive ε sufficiently close to zero), it is easy to see that (6) is violated for some strictly concave utility function as well.
(ii) Let X be any positive integrable random variable with support [0, ∞). Take Z = −2X and assume that π(Z) = E(Z). Then X + Z − π(Z) = −X + 2E(X), and its support equals
and X are not comparable in convex order. Thus Z is not a convex hedge of X, and there exists some decreasing and strictly convex function f such that
, and hence inequality (6) is satisfied by the increasing and strictly concave utility function u := −f .
In spite of these negative results, we will show in Section 5 that the idea of convex hedges and the results to be established in Sections 3 and 4 have an interesting application in the context of designing insurance indemnity schedules, in which the decision maker is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer.
Preliminaries
This section serves to introduce the notation used in this paper and recall the definitions and properties of three inter-related concepts, namely, convex order, comonotonicity, and Tail Value-at-Risk (TVaR).
All random variables discussed in this paper are defined on a common probability space (Ω, F, P), and are assumed to be integrable. Given random variables X and Y , we say that X is smaller than Y in the stop-loss order, written as
, then we say that X is smaller than Y in the convex order, written as X ≤ cx Y , and we interpret this as that X is less variable than Y . It can be shown that X ≤ cx Y if and only if E[f (X)] ≤ E[f (Y )] for any convex function f for which the two expectations exist. For a comprehensive treatment of convex order, we refer to Denuit et al. (2005) , and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) .
A useful characterization of convex order using TVaR is given by the next lemma. Throughout the paper, for a distribution function F , we use F −1 to denote its left-continuous inverse:
For a random variable Y , its TVaR at the probability level p is defined as
Lemma 1 Given random variables X and Y , X ≤ cx Y if and only if E(X) = E(Y ) and
Lemma 2 TVaR is subadditive; namely, for random variables X and Y ,
For proofs of these two lemmas and other properties of TVaR, we refer to Dhaene et al. (2006) .
A random vector (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) is comonotonic if there exist a random variable V and n increasing functions g 1 , . . . , g n such that
In particular, we may choose V to be any uniform(0, 1) random variable, and g i to be F
Furthermore, by Corollary 6.11 of Kallenberg (2002) , there is a uniform(0, 1) random variable U such that an apparently stronger condition holds true:
Equivalently, (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) is comonotonic if there is a null set N such that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
A pair of random variables (X, Y ) is said to be counter-monotonic if (X, −Y ) is comonotonic.
Lemma 3 (X, Y ) is comonotonic if and only if
The "only if" is a well-known result, see Dhaene et al. (2006) . The proof of the "if" part can be found in Cheung (2010).
The next two lemmas summarize some fundamental relationships between comonotonicity and the convex order. For proofs and further discussion, we refer to Dhaene et al. (2002a Dhaene et al. ( , 2002b ).
Lemma 4 If
The next lemma is taken from Dhaene and Goovaerts (1996) .
have the same marginal distributions and the latter is counter-monotonic, then
Proper hedges
We saw that conjectures (4) and (5) fail to hold true because the counter-monotonic asset Z may over-hedge the original position X. In this section, we suggest an extra condition to be imposed on a counter-monotonic asset so that over-hedging will not arise. To motivate our discussion, we first consider the following simple example.
Example 3 Suppose that we are holding one share of stock. Denote by X the price of the stock at a future time point. A common strategy to reduce the risk (variability) of this position is to purchase a European put option on this stock. After adding Z := (K − X) + to X, the new position is given by X + Z = max(X, K). Obviously, it is less variable than X because the lower tail of the original position X is replaced by a constant. Another strategy is to short one share of the same stock. In this case, Z := −X and thus the new position X + Z is identically zero. On the other hand, it is generally believed that longing two European put options on the stock is not a good strategy to adopt, because in this case it is not clear whether the new position X + 2(K − X) + is less variable than X.
While all of the three strategies (holding one put, shorting one unit of stock, and holding two puts) considered in Example 3 consist of adding counter-monotonic assets, our intuition suggests that the first two will not over-hedge but not necessarily the third one. There are two different heuristic considerations that allow us to distinguish the first two strategies from the third:
(1) In the first two strategies (holding a put or shorting a unit of stock), the hedged position X + Z preserves the nature of the original position X in that both of them are bullish on the stock price. In other words, (X, X + Z) is comonotonic, and hence the belief in how the markets will move remains unchanged after Z is added. If X performs well, so does the hedged position X + Z. However, the latter position (after Z is added) is less variable because of the offsetting nature of Z. For the third strategy (holding two puts), the position X + Z is no longer comonotonic with X.
(2) While Z and X move in opposite directions, the decrement (or increment) of Z is always less than the increment (or decrement) of X in the first two strategies. In this way, adding Z to X will transfer the counter-monotonic relation of (X, Z) to a counter-monotonic relation of the new portfolio X + Z with Z. However, in the third strategy, the new portfolio X + Z is not necessarily counter-monotonic anymore with the hedge Z To sum up, in order to avoid a counter-monotonic position Z to over-hedge X, the first consideration suggests that (X, X + Z) has to be comonotonic, while the second consideration suggests that (Z, X + Z) should be counter-monotonic. In the next result, we show that these two considerations are indeed equivalent, see (a) and (b). Assume that (c) is true. Fix some ω, ω ∈ Ω \ N and assume that X(ω ) ≤ X(ω). Then
which means that (X, X + Z) is comonotonic. Therefore, (a) is true. Now we assume that (a) holds true. Then there is a uniform(0, 1) random variable U such that
−Z (U )) almost surely. Denote by N the corresponding null set. Outside this null set, we have
X+Z (·) almost everywhere (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) on (0, 1). By the left-continuity of inverse distribution functions, the equality actually holds everywhere on (0, 1). From this, we obtain that F −1
For any ω, ω outside N , assume without losing generality that 0 < U (ω ) < U (ω) < 1. Then F −1
Motivated by the discussion above, we introduce the following definition. 
The collection of all proper hedges of X is denoted as H(X).
The next result shows that the counter-monotonicity of (Z, X + Z) (condition (b) of Lemma 6) implies the counter-monotonicity of (X, Z), and hence this condition alone is equivalent to Z ∈ H(X).
Proposition 1 Z ∈ H(X) if and only if (Z, X + Z) is counter-monotonic.
Proof: Suppose that Z ∈ H(X). By definition and Lemma 6, (X, Z) is counter-monotonic, and (X, X + Z) is comonotonic. Therefore, (−Z, X + Z) is comonotonic.
Conversely, suppose that (−Z, X+Z) is comonotonic. Extending this vector by including the sum of −Z and X + Z as a new component leads to (−Z, X + Z, X), which is still comonotonic. Hence by Lemma 6, Z ∈ H(X).
The next proposition characterizes proper hedges of X as transformations of X. Let Id : R → R be the identity map. Proposition 2 Z ∈ H(X) if and only if Z = −h(X) almost surely for some function h such that (h(X), (Id − h)(X)) is comonotonic.
Proof: If Z = −h(X) and (h(X), (Id−h)(X)) is comonotonic, then (Z, X +Z) = (−h(X), (Id− h)(X)) is counter-monotonic, and hence Z ∈ H(X) by Proposition 1.
Conversely, suppose that Z ∈ H(X). Since (Z, X + Z) is counter-monotonic by Proposition 1, we can write X as a comonotonic sum X = (X +Z)+(−Z). By Proposition 4.5 of Denneberg (1994) , there exist functions h and Id − h, both are increasing, such that X + Z = (Id − h)(X) and −Z = h(X) almost surely.
Let D be a subset of R. A function f : D → R is said to be 1-Lipschitz if |f (x) − f (y)| ≤ |x − y| for any x, y ∈ D. If f is increasing and if x, y ∈ D with x < y,
that is, Id − f is also increasing.
Lemma 7 A function f : D → R is increasing and 1-Lipschitz if and only if (f (X), (Id−f )(X)) is comonotonic for any random variable X taking values in D.
Proof: If f is increasing and 1-Lipschitz, then both f and Id − f are increasing, and hence (f (X), (Id − f )(X)) is comonotonic for any random variable X taking values in D. For the converse, suppose that f : D → R is a function such that (f (X), (Id−f )(X)) is comonotonic for some random variable X taking values in D. It is clear that f must be increasing on the support of X; moreover, if x and y are inside the support of X with x ≤ y, then (Id−f )(x) ≤ (Id−f )(y), which is equivalent to f (y) − f (x) ≤ y − x, so f is 1-Lipschitz on the support of X as well.
From this lemma, we can rephrase Proposition 2 and give a more explicit description of the function h there as follows: Z ∈ H(X) if and only if Z = −h(X) almost surely for some h which is increasing and 1-Lipschitz on the support of X.
Proper hedge and convex order
In this section, we show that both conjectures (4) and (5) hold true if Z is a proper hedge of X.
In particular, all proper hedges of X are counter-monotonic convex hedges of X.
Proof: Fix any p ∈ (0, 1). Since Z ∈ H(X), (−Z, X + Z) is comonotonic by Proposition 1. It follows from Lemma 3 that
Since X ≤ cx Y and −E(Z) ≤ cx −Z, Lemma 1 implies that
Combining all these, we have
Proof: Similarly as done in the proof of Theorem 1, for any 0 < p < 1, we have
where the last inequality follows from the subadditivity of TVaR. Hence, X + Z ≤ cx Y + Z by Lemma 1.
Implications in optimal insurance problems
Suppose that a risk bearer is exposed to a positive insurable random loss X, and wishes to reduce the risk by purchasing an insurance for X. Let I be the indemnity purchased such that the risk bearer will receive I(x) from the insurer if x is the realization of X. In this section, we assume that the indemnity schedule I is increasing and satisfies 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x, in order to avoid moral hazard.
The insurer, who relies on the law of large numbers and is reasonably risk-neutral (page 45 of Eeckhoudt et al. (2005)), usually sets the premium P at a level that is greater than E[I(X)] to avoid a loss on average. Suppose that the risk bearer is an expected utility maximizer with a wealth w and an increasing and concave utility function u. He will be better off after purchasing
Let P * (u, w, X, I) be the amount of premium that makes the inequality above an equality. This utility-equivalent premium is the maximum amount the risk bearer is willing to pay for the insurance protection I. In order for this insurance arrangement to be mutually beneficial to both the risk bearer and the insurer, P * (u, w, X, I) has to be greater than E[I(X)].
Assume that the insurer has to provide a schedule I to all potential policyholders with different risk preferences (represented by their utility functions) and risk profiles (represented by the wealths and potential losses), but does not provide a tailor-made schedule to individual policyholders as in some adverse selection models. See, for instance, Carlier and Dana (2005), Cheung et al. (2011b) , Landsberge and Meilijson (1999) , and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . In this situation, I has to be carefully designed so that it is not only beneficial and attractive to all potential policyholders but also profitable to the insurer. This leads us to propose the following new concept.
Definition 3 Let I be an indemnity schedule. If for any positive integrable random variable X, any wealth level w, and any increasing and concave utility function u, the solution to the equation, provided the expectations are well-defined,
denoted as P * (u, w, X, I), is greater than E[I(X)], then I is said to be universally marketable.
From this definition, an indemnity schedule I is universally marketable if a mutually acceptable premium can be found for every risk bearer, regardless of the wealth, the utility function, and the underlying risk. This notion depends on how we judge the acceptability of a given premium. In our setting here, a premium is acceptable to the insurer if it is not less than the expected payment (from the risk-neutrality of the insurer), and is acceptable to the risk bearer if a higher level of expected utility can be achieved after purchasing the insurance.
It is evident that a given indemnity schedule I may not be universally marketable without possessing some extra properties. The main objective of this section is to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for universal marketability; see Theorem 3 below.
Recall that all indemnity schedules considered here are assumed to be increasing a priori.
Theorem 3 An indemnity schedule I is universally marketable if and only if it is 1-Lipschitz.
Proof: Let X be an arbitrary positive integrable random variable, and I be a 1-Lipschitz indemnity schedule. By Lemma 7 (I(X), X − I(X)) is comonotonic. It then follows from Lemma 6 that −I(X) ∈ H(X). Theorem 1 then implies
Therefore, for any wealth level w and any increasing and concave utility function u,
As u is increasing, P * (u, w, X, I) ≥ E[I(X)], and hence I is universally marketable.
To prove the converse, assume that I is not 1-Lipschitz. Then there exist a > 0 and ε > 0 such that δ := I(a + ε) − I(a) > ε. We want to show that the universal marketability condition E[I(X)] ≤ P * (u, w, X, I) is violated by some carefully chosen X and u. To this end, choose any p ∈ (0, 1 − ε/δ), and define a discrete random variableX bỹ X = a, with probability p, a + ε, with probability 1 − p.
Since (a − I(a)) − (a + ε − I(a + ε)) = δ − ε > 0, the maximum value thatX − I(X) can take equals a − I(a). On the other hand, the maximum value thatX − E[I(X)] can take equals a + ε − E[I(X)], but In particular, this implies that E[I(X)] > P * (ũ, w,X, I), and hence I is not universally marketable.
By Lemma 7, the 1-Lipschitz property of an indemnity I is equivalent to the comonotonicity of the share of the loss borne by the insurer, I(X), and the share of the loss borne by the policyholder, X − I(X), for any loss variable X. Many commonly encountered indemnity schedules are 1-Lipschitz, such as Theorem 3 explains the popularity of these indemnity schedules in the insurance market. In fact, in the study of optimal insurance design, the 1-Lipschitz condition is often imposed in the definition of admissible insurance indemnities because of its natural interpretation in terms of moral hazard avoidance; see, for instance, Cheung et al. (2011a) and Denuit and Vermandele (1998) . Theoretical justifications of the 1-Lipschitz condition can be found in Carlier and Dana (2005) and Young (1999) , in which optimal insurance indemnities are necessarily 1-Lipschitz for several optimal insurance models. Theorem 3 provides another perspective for the 1-Lipschitz condition.
